Sequential naturC of decisions.
Rarely is one decision completcl. uncoupled from other decisions. Choices today affect both the alternatives availabec in the future and the desirability of those alternatives. Indeed, many of our present •.
•,iices are important becatue of the options the\ open or close or the information the\ provide rather than because of their direc! consequences.
Complexity cannot be avoided in making decisions. It is part of the problems. not onl. part c~f the solution process, There are, ho" ever, options concerning the degree of formnality used to address the complexity. Near one extreme, this ma\ be done ;ntuiti\el.\ in a rather informal manner. Near the other extreme, formal models can be used to capture as, much of the complexity as possiblc. In any case, the process of obtaining and combining the available inftormation is a difficult task that requires balancing all the pros and cons aw well as recognizing the uncertainties for each alternati\c .
WHAT IS DECISION ANALYSIS
Decision analysis can be defined on different l.h'vels. Intuitivchl, I think ot decisioon analysis as "a formalization of common sense for decision problems which are too comple., for informal use of common sense." A more technical definition of decision analysis is "a philosophy, articulated b\ a set of Ikgical axioms, and a methodology and collection of s.\stematic procedure.ý, based upon those axioms, for responsibly analyzing the complexities inherent in decision problems."
The foundations of decision an.,.iysis are provided by a set of axioms stated alternativel\ in von Neumann and Morgenstern 11947). Savage 11954] , and Pratt, Raiffa. and Schlaifer 11964] . and the Appendix of this article. These axioms, which provide principles for analyzing decision prohlems, imply that the attractiveness of alternati\,..:, should depend on ( 1) the likelihoods of the possible consequences of each alternative, and (2) the preferences of the iecision makers for those consequences. The philosophical implications of the axioms arc that all decisions require subjective judgments and that the lik.lihoods of consequerices anJ their desirability should be separately estimated using probabilities and utilities respectively. The technical implications of the axioms ire that the probabilities and utilities can be used to calculate the expected utility of each alternative and that alternativcs with higher expected utilities should be preferred. The practical implication of the decision anaiysis axioms is the provision of a sound basis and general approach for including judgments and values In an analysis of decision alternatives. This permits systematic analysis in a defensible manner of a vast range of decision problems.
)Decision analysis focuses otn aspects fundamental to all deciion probleni., nancl, ,, ..
A~~~,
fIjctv s I, a perceived need to accomplish some objectives, TIC 2, several alternaiv.s, one of which must be selected.
3. the consequences associated with alternatives ire different, • , .
"4, uncertainty usually about the consequences ol each alternative 5. the possible consequences are not all equally valued...
[
The decision problem is decomposed into parts, which are separately analyved and integrated with the logic of the decision analysis axioms to suggest which alternative should be chosen. This "diihde and conquer" orientation is almost essential for addressing interdisciplinary problem.b. The met hodology of decision analysis provides a framework to combine traditional techniques o. operation, research, management science, and systems ami lysis with professional judgments and values in a unified analysis to support decision making, With the procedures of decision analyis. models (e.g., economic, scientific. operations research). available data, information from samples and tests. and experts' knowledge are used to quantify likelihoods of various consequences of alternatives in terms of probabilities, Utility theory is used to quantify the values of decision makers for these consequences. Decision anal'.sis is not a tool. Decision analysis is not simply a tool or a niethodolog., although it is both sometimes used and perceived as such. Tools of disciplines such as operations research and management science often assume that both the alternatives and objectives of a problem are exogenously provided to the study, Queuing theory, inventor\ theory, and mathematical programming, for example, concentrate much more on analyzing given alternatives with prescribed objectives, This is of course critically important. However, for less structured decision problems, more time is required to create the alternatives and articulate the objectives before analysis can occur, Decision analysis is designed for such problems, Another important difference which distinguishes tools from decision analysis is the existence of fundamental axioms to provide a philosophicallv and theoretically sound foundation from which its resulting methodology is developed, Objective, value.free anialysis is not possible or desirable. A comment sometimes heard from analysts. governmental authorities, and managers of organizations is that what is rcally needed to help decision makers is objective, value-free analysis, Simply stated, there is no such thing as objective or value-free analysis. Furthermore, anyone who purports to conduct such an analysis is professionally "cry naive, stretching the truth, or using definitions of objective and salue-free which are quite different from those commonly used. Professional judgments and value judgments are absolutely necessary in essentially every step of analysis in order to address the complexities of decision problems. Objective, value-free analysis would be undesirable because it would simply avoid the problem. What is needed is logical, systematic analysis that makes the necessary profes. sional and v..lue judgments explicit and combines these with the "objective" data for the problem. The resulting analysis should be responsive to the decision maker's needs and justifiable to others, Decision anal' sis is uniquely a methodology which provides for such analysis.
Decision analaysis is prescriptive in nature. Prescriptive decision analyses are conducted to indicate which alternative should be chosen to be consistent with the information about the problem and the values of decision makers. This can be contrasted with descriptive studies which attempt to describe how and perhaps why a particular decision was or will be made. Descriptive studies provide useful information (e.g.. about cognitive processes on how a competitor might behave) for prescriptive analyses, but by themselves are not prescriptive decision analyses.
It has been clearly demonstrated that individuals often do not make decisions in a manner consistent with the decision analysis axioms (see. for example, Kahneman and Tversky 119791).
However, many of those same individuals find the axioms compelling for prescribing their evaluatiuln of alternatives. The fact is that in complex decision environments, many decision makers prefer to act in accord with the decision analysis axioms and yet seriously violate them in selecting alternatives without the benefit of a decision analysis. This is a strong motivation for the prescriptive appeal of the approach.
Decision o'nah'isis doe.P not solve probh'm., Decision analysis will not solve a decision problem, nor is it intended to. Its purpose is to produce insight and promote creativity to help decision makers make better decisions. It does this by providing a methodology and procedures t) decompose the problem into parts that can be meaningfully analyzed, a logic to integrate the parts. and documentation for supporting a decision to others. No analysis includes everything of importance in a deci. sion problem. In selecting an alternative the decision makers should jointly %cigh the implications of an analysis together with other factors not in the analysis.
This odientation simukaneously implies that decision analysis is not up to the task of solving any decision problem, but that it is appropriate to all, Of course it is not worth analyzing ever\ problem. More difficult decisi,,, problems are naturally more difficult to analyze. This is true regardle.s of the degree to which formal analysis (i.e. use of models as a decision aid) or intuitive appraisal (i.e., in one's head) is used. However, as complexity increases, the cfficac\ of the intuitive appraisal decreases at a more rapid rate than that of formal anal.,sis. Thus, roughly speaking. it may' be more useful to analyze 6(0 percent of a difficult problem than 90 percent of a simpler prioblem.
There is another critical factor which relates to the complexilt, of the decision problem. As complexity increases, the percentage of the problem which can be captured by "hard data" decreases. Simultaneously, the role that values, professional judgment, and experienlc must necessarily play in the decision process increases. We do not have data bases for the possible consequences of a particular merger, the overall impacts of "rescuing an industry." the "true" probabilitv of low probability-high consequence events, the price and availahilit\ of oil in 199(0. or the value of the environmental, economic, and social consequences of an oil shale program. Yet decision, involsing such factors will necessarily continue and are crucial to everyone. Of all analytical meth. odologies, only decision analysis provides the theory and procedures to address these directl\ and incorporate them into a decision problem. It does not provide "the answers" or "the solution ," but it does address the right questions.
Decision analysi,% and deciion theorv art not it'e san•e. Broadly interpreted, decision theory is the logical foundations of decision analysis and the technical implications wkhich follow. Decision theory does not include the techniques or skills for structuring decision problems or assessment of probabilities or utilities. The more common interpretation of decision theory is a sampling theor.
involving statistical problems (see Waild 119501, Savage 119541. and Raiffa and Schlailer [1I•96) ).
This narrow focus of decision theory plus the common misunderstanding that decision analysis and decision theory are essentially the same has led to a misinterpretation about the breadth of problems to which decision analysis is relevant,
THE METHODOLOGY OF DECISION ANALYSIS

A
This section presents an overview of the methodology of decision analysis. It is clearly not possible to delve into too much detail. Books by Raiff, 11968). Schlaifer [i196) . Tribus [1969] . Brown et a) , [1974] , Keenev and Raiffa 11976) . Moore and Thomas [1976) , Kaulman and Thomas 11977), LaValle 11978]. and Holloway 11979) provide more details on various aspects of the methodology. Our purpose is to indicate its general thrust, with emphasis on thosc aspects unique to decision analysis.
For discussion purposes, the methodology of decision analysis will be decomposed into four steps: I 1. structure the decision problem.
2, assess possible impacts of each alternative, 3. determine preferences (values) of decision makers. and 4. evaluate and compare alternatives. Figure I illustrates the interdependencies of the steps and indicates where the components of cormplexity introduced in Section 1 are addressed. To interpret the implications of these steps, it is Upeiyaeses !5 I important to keep two facts in mind. First. one iterates among the various steps. Not only what should be done in one step but how it should be done can be affected by preliminary results from another step. Second, decision analyses concentrating on some steps almost to the exclusion of others are often appropriate and useful. Such considerations are mentiond in more detail in Section 4 on the practice of decision analysis.
St,:p I-Structure the Decision Problem
Structuring the decision problem includes the generation of alternatives and the specification of objectives. The creativity required for these tasks is promoted by the systetmatic thought processes of decision analysis.
Decision analysis captures the dynamic nature of decision proccsses. It prescribes a decision strategy that indicates what action should be chosen initially and what further aciions should be selected for each subsequent event that could occur, For instance, a decision stralegy might suggest an initial test market for a new product and then, based on the results. either cancel the product. initiate further testing, or begin a full scale marketing and sales effort, Thus. in describing the alternatives, one must simultaneously specify the decision points, events that may occur between them, and the information that can be learned in the process. This dynamic structure can conveniently be reiesented as a decision tree ).
Two major problems are associated with generating alternatives. First. there may be a large number of potential alternatives, many of whic', are not particularly good. However. early in the investigation of the decision problem, it may be difficult to differentiate between the good alternatives and those which are eventually found to be clearlv inferior. In such circumstances, inferior options can be identified by screening models which use assumptions too crude for a final evaluation but sensitive enough to weed out the "bad" alternatives. These models analyze a simplified decision problem by using deterministic rather than probabilistic impacts. dominance or "almost dominance" rather than a complete objective function. and constraints. This has the effect of eliminating alternatives so the deci-ion tree is pruned to a manageable size. Then. more time and effort can be expended to carefully appraise the remaining viable alternatives,
Step 1 Structure the
Step 2 A•sLss Possible
Step 3 Determine Preler
Step 4 A second major problem associated with generating alternatives is that sometimes there seems to be a complete lack of reasonable alternatives. In this case. it is often worthwhile to utilize the objectives of the problem to stimulate creativity. Basically. if the objectives are clearly specified. one can describe possible consequences of the problem which seem particularly desirable. Then c ,e works backward and asks what types of alternatives might achieve such consequences. The process of quantifying the objectives with an object~ve function (i.e., a utility function as discussed in
Step 3) promotes additional thinking about worthwh' , alternatives. The result of such a process is often a broadening of alternatives, which is actuallý d broadening of the decision problem. For instance, a significant increase in local crime may result in a "premature" decision that more police are needed. An analysis may then be initiated of alternatives differing only in the number of additional police. However, the problem is presumably much broader. The objective would likely be to minimize crime or to minimize specific impacts of crime. From this perspective, one may create alternatives involving additional police equipment (e.g.. cars, communications), different operating policies with existing personnel and equipment, community action programs to report "suspicious" activity, or the reduction of early release programs for hard-core criminals in jails. A critical change is often the introduction of dynamic alternatives rather than reliance on static alternatives alone. The difference is that a dynamic alternative is designed to be adapted over time based on external circumstances that occur and information that is learned.
The starting point for specifying objectives is the creation of a rather unstructured list of concern-, indicating anything of interest about possible consequences of the alternatives. These need to be organized into a set of general concerns. For instance, with many problems involving siting large-scale facilities, the general concerns may be environmental impact, economics. sociocconomics, health and safety, and public attitude,;. To determine specific objectives, the question is.
for example. what are the environmental impacts of concern for a particular problem. The proccsv of answering such questions is essentially a creative task. However. previous studies on rel!ated topics and legal and regulatory guidelines should b..! ot significant help in articulating nhji'.c.. Also. for problems which require external revi,-". For cael of the towet!-lcvel objectives in tht' hierarhy. -,;e need it) identil attributes it, meamure the degree to which the' ob ective i,; achieved Sometimes this is easy. For example. an obvious attribute for the objective -maximize profits" is milliuns ot dollars (why not think big?). However, it is more difficult to determine an attribute for ;a .
., . like "minimize visual degradation." This often requires constrLcting an attribute to measuie Oith o jective using procedures such as those in Keeney [1981] .
Let us now introduce notation to concisely describe our problem structure. We have generated a number of alternatives A,, j = I J...., and an objectives hierarchy with n lowest-level objectives O,i i = ... n, where n may be one. With these lowest-level objectives would be associated attributes X, i I..... n. Furthermore, define x, to be a specific level ef X,, so the possible impact of selecting an alternative can be characterized by the consequence x U (x,.x, ..... x,). An example of an objective 0, is "maximize the local economic benefit" and an associ•'ed attribute X, may be "annual local tax paid," A level x, could then be $29 million.
The first step of decision analysis addresses several complexities discussed in Section 1. The multiple objective feature is addressed by specifying O 1 to 0. Some of these objectives concern the implications to various impacted groups so this feature is also considered. The intangibles are included by using objectives such as "minimize aesthetic disruption" and. of course, significant effort is focused on the complexity of generating viable dynamic alternatives.
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Step 2-Assess Possible Impacts of Alternatives In this step of decision analysis, we wish to determine the impacts of each alternatike, If it were possible to precisely forecast these impacts. we could associate one consequence with eaLh alternative. Then the evaluation of alternatives would boil down to a choice of the best consequence. Unfortunately, the problem is usually not so easy because of uncertainties about the eventual consequences. Therefore. for each possible alternative, it is desirable to determine the set of possible consequences and the probabilities of each occurring. This can be done forinall\ by determining a probability distribution function P 1 (x) over the set of attributes for each alternative A,. In some cases the uncertainty associated with in alternative may he small. Then, an appropriate simplification is to omit the uncertainty for that alternative. Because one can treat p, in general to include cases with no uncertainty (where pj(x) assigns a probability one to a particular x and zero to all others). we will use p, throughout.
When feasible, meaning that both general knowledge about tne prol~lem structure and the scope of the project allows it. it is desirable to determine probabilities of possible consequences with the development and use of formal models. These models typicall. utilize the traditional methodologies of operations research, management science, systems analysis. simulation. planning. and the sciences and engineering. Complex models canl often be constructed to have several components, each pertaining to knowledge associated with a single discipline or organizational unit. For instance, in a decision analvsis by Smallwood and Morris [1980] to examine whether to build a new manuficturing facility, a model had components concerning the market for the proposed prod-;ict n-imin,'nannc. production. capital costs, the competition. and the financial ir.mpact to the cornpany. Expcl i•: cach of these substantive areas could then provide information on their respective plil.r o! the problem. Hence. these models allow one to break the assessment into manageable parts and combine the parts to determine p* When a model is utilized. cithcr deterministic or probabilistic information is required to specify model inputs in order to determine appropriate probability distributions over model outputs (i.e.. consequences). When a model is not appropriate, information is necessary to directly determine possible consequences. In both cases, such information must be based on the analysis of existing data. data collected specifically for the decision problem, or professional judgment. D'ata analysis is common to many disciplines other than decision analysis so, although it is important. it will be passed over here. The quantitative assessment of professional judgments or probabilities is a unique aspect of decision analysis discussed below.
There are several methods for quantifying probabilities (see Winkler 11967a ]. Spetzler and Stadl von Holstein [1975] , and StaIl von H-ilstein and Matheson [19"9] ). One method is to use a standard probability distribution function and assess parameters for that function. For example, the parameters of a normal distribution can be the mean and standard deviation. Another technique. referred to as a fractile method, involves directly assessing points on the cumulative probability density function. Suppose y is the single dimensional parameter of interest and we wish to assess the probability density function p(y). One is asked fot a level y' such that the probability is p' that the actual level is less than y'. This questioning is repeated for several probabilities such as p = 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.95, Alternatively one can ask for a probability p" that the y-level is less than y", By fitting a common probability distribution to the assessed data. one obtains p(y). A third procedure for assessment is appropriate when the possible impact is categorized into a number of distinct levels. The professional familiar with the subject is asked to specify directly the probability of each level, These assessments may' sound easy, but in practice they are involved processes with many potential sources for error (see. for example. Kahneman [1974. 1981] ). However, recent experience suggests that professionals with training can formulate probabilistic forecasts in a reliable manner (see Murphy and Winkler 119771).
A factor which can increase the complexity of impact assessments is probabilistic dependencies among attributes for given alternatives. If two attributes are probabilistically dependent. the impact specified for one will affect the assessed impact on the other, When there are such conditional dependencies, it is almost essential to either model these dependencies and develop probabilistic assessments using t~e output of the model or to bound the possible probability distributions utilizing logic and understanding of the problem (see. for example. Sarin [1978] and Kirkwood and Pollack [1980] ). Then one can investigate whether and how the dependencies influence the evaluation of alternatives. When such dependencies turn out to be important, additional effort to better characterize them may be appropriate.
A host of additional difficulties can occur when more than one expert is asked for professional judgments about the same events. These experts may have different opinions, and yet it may be almost impossible to find out the reasons for the differences. And the experts likely formulate their judgments based in part on the same experiments and data sources. so they are not independent, Still, the decision maker may desire a single coherent representation of the uncertainty in the problem. Recent contributions by Morris [1977] and Winkler [1981] address this problem, which is one area of current research in decision analysis.
Specifying probability distributions addresses the risk and uncertainty aspects of the decision problem. in describing the possible impacts. the time in which consequences might occur should be indicated. Thus. the feature of long-time horizons is addressed in this step. The interdisciplinar. substance is also included by utilizing the skills of the various discipline-. to develop and structure models, provide information and professional judgments relevant to the discipline, and appraise the results of the model about possible consequences concerning the disciplinary substance.
"r..n 3--Determine Preferences (Values) to Decision Makers 1, would likely be impossible to achiee the best level with respect to each objective in a derision problem The question is. "How much should be given up with regard to one objective to achie-e a specified improvement on another?" The issue is one of value tradeoffs. For decision problcr-s with either single or multiple objectives, it is rarel\ the case (except in simple problems) that oni ,.'ernative is guaranteed to yield the best available consequence. There are usually circumstanc,.s that could lead to undesirable consequences with any given alternative. The question is, "Are the r,'tential benefits of having things go right worth the risks if things go wrong?" This issue , about &ilk attitudes. Both value tradeoffs and risk attitudes are particularl. complicated because toerh are no riht or wrong values. 3assally, what is needed is an objective function which aggre-;,,ties all ýih , in'iividuai objectives and an attitude toward risk. In decision analysis, such an objective iunction is referred to as a utility function, symbolically written u, Then u(x), the utility of the consequence x, indicates the desirability of x relative to all other consequences. As mentioned in Section 2, following directly from the axioms of decision analysis, alternatives with higher expected (i.e., average) utilities should be preferred to those with lower expected utilities.
This step. rather unique to decision analysis, involves the creation of a model of values to evaluate the alternatives. This is done in a structured discussion with the decision makers to quantify value judgments about possible consequences in the problem. The procedure systematically elicits relevant information about value tradeoffs, equity concerns, and risk attitudes with provision for consistency checks. In addition to the obvious advantage of providing a theoretically sound manner to evaluate alternatives, the explicit development of a valtue model offers several other advantages, including indicating which information is of interest in the problem. suggesting alternatives that may have been overlooked, providing a means to calculate the value of obtaining additional information, and facilitating concise communication about objectives among interested parties. In addition, a sensitivity analysis of the value judgments can be conducted to appraise their importance for the overall decision.
The process of determining the utility function can be broken into five steps: (1) introducing the terminology and ideas, (2) determining the general preference structure, (3) assessing singleattribute utility functions, (4) evaluating scaling constants, and (5) checking for consistency and reiterating. For decision problems with a single objective, only Steps 1. 3, and 5 are relevant. In practice there is considerable interaction among the steps although each will be separately discussed.
Introducing the Terminology and Ideas. rhe basic purpose of this step is to develop a rapport and an ability to communicate with the decision maker or decision makers. It should be stated that the goal of the assessment process is to end up with a consistent representation of preferences for evaluating alternatives. "he analyst should make sure that the decision makers are comfortable with the assessment procedure and understand the meaning of each attribute and the objective it is meant to measure. If the decision makers have not been closely inolved in defining the attributes or describing the impacts of alternatives, this phase of communication is particularly important. The decision makers shoold understand that there are no correct or incorrect preferences and that expressed preferences can be altered at any, time.
Determnining The General Preference Structure. Here, one structuies preferences with a model indicating the general functional form of the utility function u(x 1 ..... xn). To obtain the structure for multiple objectives, on,' uses value independence concepts in the same way that probabilistic independence is utilized in structuring models of impacts. Most of the independence concepts concern relative values for consequences with levels of a subset of the attributes fixed. The independence concepts ar. used to derive a simple function f such as
where the u, are single-attribute utility functions and the km 'ire scaling constants. Specific functional forms following from various assumptions are found in Fishburn [1964 Fishburn [ , 1965 Fishburn [ , 1970 . Meyer [1970] , Farquhar [1975] . Keeney and Raiffa [1976] , Bell [1977b Bell [ , 1979b , Tamura and Nakamura [1978] . and Farquhar and Fishburn [1981] . Using (1) . the overall utility function is determined by assessing the vingle-attribute utility functions and the scaling constants which weight various combinations of single-attribute functions.
A related approach to model values for multiple objectives involves building a value function v(x 1 ..... ,x,), which assigns higher numbers (ie,, values) to preferred consequences, This is done in a spirit akin to (1) using either single-attribute value functions or indifference curves together with scaling constants, Then a utility function is assessed over value providing u[v(x)] which incorporates value tradeoffs in v and an attitude toward risk in u, Models of value functions addressing multiple object.ves are found in Debreu [1960] , Koopmans [1960] . Luce and Tukey [196A]. Krantz [1964] . Krantz et al. [1971] , Dyer and Sarin [1979] . Kirkwood and Sarin [1980] . and Keelin [1981] , A commonly used value function is discounting of cash flows over time at a fixed rate. Boyd [1973] and Keeney and Raiffa [1976] 
discuss procedures to obtain both v(x) and u(v).
Assessing Single-Attribute Utility Functions. Procedures for assessing single-attribute utility functions are well developed. In summary, one wishes to first determine the appropi, :-risk attitude. For instance, for consequences involving profits. one is said to be risk averse i' irofit level (xi + x.)/2 is always preferred to a lottery yielding either x, or x. each with a probability of 0.5, In this case, one prefers the average of the profits x, and x 2 for sure rather than risk a half chance of the higher and a half chance of the lower. When one is risk averse, it must be the case that the corresponding single-attribute utility function is concave, As discussed in Pratt [1964] , special risk attitudes restrict the functional form of single-attribute utility functions. A common utility function is the exponential utility function u'kx) =-a + b-" p2 where a, b>0, c>0 are scaling constants. This utility function is referred it. as constantly risk averse since it is the only one consistent with the following property. If x 3 for sure is indifferent to a 0.5 chance at either x, or x,, then x3+e must be indifferent to 0.5 chances at either x, + ( or x. +F for all possible r
To specify the scaling constants a and b in (2). one arbitrarily sets the utility corresponding to two consequences, This is similar to defining a temperature scale by selecting a boiling and a freezing point. The utilities of all other consequei..es are relative to the two chosen for the scale. To specify the appropriate numerical value for a constant c in (2). one can identify both a lottery and a consequence which are equally preferred by the decision maker. For instance, suppose the decision maker is indifferent between the certain consequence x 3 and a lottery yielding either x, or x. with equal chances of 0.5. Then, to be consistent with the axioms of decision analysis. the utility of x 3 must be set equal to the expected utility of the lottery. Hence, u(xi) = 0.5u(xi) + 0.5u(x 2 ). (3) Substituting (2) into (3) and solving gives us the value for parameter c.
Evaluating Scaling Constants. With multiple objectives, the same concept is utilized to determine scaling constants, which relaie to the relative desirability of specified changes of different attribute levels. To illustrate this in a simple case, consider the additive utility function
i-i where k,, i= 1 ,n are scaling cons:ants. For this additive utility function, th'e values of the k, indicate the relative importance of changing each attribute from its least desirable to its "iost desirable level. To assejs these scaling constants, one generates data reprLsenting stated value judgments of the decision rraker. For instance, the decision maker may be indifferfent between (x 1 ..... x.) and (x 1 ,....x). Then the utility of these two consequences, since they are indifferent, must be equal. They are set equal using (4) which yields an equation with the scaling factors as unknowns, Using such indifferences, one generates a set of n independent equations which is solved to detwrmine values for the n unknown scaling factors. The equations can be generated by sequentially considering consequences which differ in terms of the levels of only two attributes. This significantly simplifies the comparison task required of the decision makers. More details about the assessment of utility functions can be found in Fishbuia [1967j, Huber [1974 , Keeney and Raiffa [1976] . Bell [1979a] . and many other sources. Checking consistency. It has been my experience that invariably there are inconsistencies in the initial assessments. In fact, this is one of the main reasons for the procedure, because once these inconsistencies are identified, decision makers upon reflection can alter somL of their responses to reach consistency and better reflect their basic values, Furthermore, they seem to f.el better after having straightened out their value structure in their own mind, Thus, it is essential to ask questions in different ways and carefully reiterate through aspects of the assessment procedure until a consistent representation of the decision maker's values is achieved. Conducting sensitivity analysis of the evaluation of alternatives (Step 4 of decision anaiysis) may suggest if the utility function is a good enough representation of decision maker values.
With multiple decision makers, as discussed in Harsanyi !1955], Fishburn [IQ73], or Keeney and Raiffa [1976] , additional value judgments -,,re required to address the relative importance of the different decision makers and the relative intensity of the potential impact to each in urder to determine an overall utility function. Alternately. the decision problem can be analyzed from :he viewpoints of the different decision makers by using their own utility functions. It may be that the same alternative is preferred by each decision maker. possibly for different reasons, In any case. it might be helpful to eliminate dominated alternatives. identify the basis for conflicts, and sugges:t mechanisms for resolution.
This tiwird stzp of decision analysis uses value judgments to address the complexi ;es concerning value tradeoffs, and a risk attitude outlined in Section 1. The value judgments are made explicit in assessing u for each decision maker. This process of building a model of values corrcsponds precisely with that used for an\ model, We gather tome data (the decision maker's judgments), and use the data in a generic model (the utility function u) to calculate its paramaters (e.g., the kn's in (1) and c in (2)). Additional value judgments are ne-essary to structure values of multiple decision makers into one coherer* utility function.
Step 4-Evaluate and Compare Alternatives.
Once a decision problem is structured, the magnitude and associated likelihoods of cor,nsequences determined, and the preference structure established, the infu, marion must be synthe',ized in a logical manner to evaluate the alternatives. :t follows from the axioms of decision analysis thai the basis for this evaluation is the expected utility Ej(u) for each Alternative Ai. wnich is
The higher Ej(u) is. the more desirable the alternative. Thus the magnitudes of Ej(u) can be used to establish a ranking that indicates the decik,n maker's preferences for the alternatives. It should be remembered that the expected utility associated with an alternativ' i: directly related to the objectives originally chosen to guide the decision and reflects the degree of achievement of the objectives. One can transform the Ej(u) numbers back into equivalent consequences to obtain Sinformation about how much one alternative is preferred over another.
It is extremely important to examine the sensitivity of the decision to different views about the uncertainties associated with the various consequences and to different value structures. This is conceptually easy with decision analysis, since the impacts and values are explicitly quantified with probability distributions and the utility function, respectively. Without quantification it would be 11 ! difficult to conduct a thorough sens: ity analysis. A useful way of presenting the results of a sensitivity analysis is to identify sets of conditions, in terms of uncertainties and preferences, under which various options should be preferred.
PRACTICE OF DECISION ANALYSIS
The ultimate purpose of decision anilysis is to help decision makers make better decisions. The foundations, provided by the axioms do not "assume the problem away). Even though the theory and procedures are straight-forward, a price isIpaid for attempting to address the complexities of a decision problem explicitly. The implementation phase, that is putting the methodology into practice, is more involved compared to other forms of analysis. A significantly greater portion of the overall effort in decision analysis is spent generating alternatives, specifying objectives, eliciting professional and value judgmei,'1. and interpreting implications of the analysis. Each of these requires interaction with the decision makers and individuals knowledgeable about the problem substance. Structured creative thinking is demanded and sensitive information is elicited.
In this section, we suggest how to conduct a decision analysis and the art cf interaction necessary to elicit information. Several uses of decision analysis in addition to evaluating alternatives are indicated. Finaidy some key potential pitfalls are identified.
Conducting a Decision Analysis
A careful definition of the decision problem is essential. For complex problems. an adequatc definition is rarely available at the time the analysis is to begin. Yet, it is tempting to begin analyzing the problem immediately. What is available at the beginning is a somewhat vaguely perceived notion of problem objectives and possible alternatives. Defining a problem means the following: generating specific objectives with appropriate attributes and articulating dynamic alternatives including possible information to be learned in the decision process. The attributes indicate what information is wanted about the alternatives, namely the degree to which the alternatives measure up in terms of the attributes.
If the utility function is assessed to quantify ihe decision maker's values, this will indicate the relative importance of gathering different information. That is, Step 3 of a decision analysis can proceed before Step 2 (see Figure 1 ). This is often useful because structuring a decisinn problem and assessing values require only personal interaction which is much less expensive than field tests, equipment, and surveys often necessary to quantify the impacts of the alternatives. Knowing what information to collect may reduce this burden or at least focus it on the information desired. One other point is worth mentioning in this regard. There is one value structure for a decision problem since each alternative is to achieve the same objectives. There are possible impacts to be assessed for each alternative. Thus, concentrating on the values first and thoroughly may save time. effort, and money on a decision analysis, and result in more useful insights for the problem.
Once the decision problem is well-structured, the collection of information should proceed as indicated in Step 2 of Section 3. The procc:-s may be complicated because of problem substance or required personal interaction. The former situation is not unique to decision analysis and will not be discussed further.
The Art of Decision Analysis Interaction
A key to successful decision analysis is the interaction of decision analysts with thL, !ecision makers and other professionals working on the project. As with all forms of personal interaction, there is a great deal of art and skill required. Most of the skills required to be a successful member of any group are also necessary to be a successful member of the team analyzing the decision process. However, because of the nature of dcc'sion analysis, we will note a few special aspects related to that interaction process.
Decision analysts obtain clearly articulated (often quantitative) information about the problem structure, possible impacts. paranmeters for a model, and value judgments, In addition to the complexity of the problem substance, the practice of obtaining such information is sometimes difficult because:
1. the information may be sensitive, 2. the natural procedures to process the information in one's mind often result in biased judgments, 3. the respondent may have a vested interest in misrepresenting information.
The decision anaiyst should be aware of any of these three possibilities. In a recent article, Fischhoff [1980] draws an analogy between decision analysis and psychotherapy. Decision analysts try to formalize the thinking and feelings that the decision maker wishes to use on the problem. By clarifying and even quantifying the process, these thoughts and feelings are potentially opened for review by others (e.g., bosses, regulators. courts). In any assessment process, one should take the time and use any available devic.zs to establish a rapport with the respondent and to make him or her feel comfortable. I always point out that the reason for the analysis is that the problems are too difficult tn informally analyze consistent!v. Hence. a major purpose of these processes is to identify inconsistencies in the unassisted thinking of the respondent. It is critical to assure these individuals that they will have a first right to adequately review your work. Furthermore, they should have the option of changing their responses. This helps to ensure that no misrepresentation of their judgments occurs. What this boils down to is the need to build trust between the decision analyst and al! respondents working on a decision problem, The establishment of this trust must be the responsibility of the decision analyst. Kahneman [1974, 1981] have identified many biases that indi.'iduals may inadvertently utilize in providing professional or value judgments. It is probably safe to say that these biases occur with any procedure, tormal or informal, to assist in the decision making process, With decision analysis which focuses on such issues. reasonable procedures have been developed with enough consistency checks to avoid or at least identify the major biases which may be influencing the particular analysis. Many professionals. including and Winkler [1967b] . Slovic and Lichtenstein [1971] , Hogarth [1075], Spetzler and Stadl von Holstein [1975] . Fischer [1976 Fischer [ . 1979 . Seaver. Edwards, and von Winterfeldt [1978] . and Alpert and Raiffa [1981] . have compared various approaches to examine their strengths , nd weaknesses for such assessments.
A more difficult issue for the analyst might be that of potential confic*. A decision maker who wishes that a particular product be produced and marketed may be motivated to overestimate its potential sales. A product manager being evaluated on meeting a specific goal may care to underestimate the potential sales during the goal setting process. To assist in identifying such conflicts, aside from one's knowledge of the position of individuals with respect to the problem, several techniques are used to reduce the conflicts.
Effects due the sensitive nature of decisior information, inherent conflicts, and unconscious biases, can be reduced by using four devices: iteration with consistency checks, assessments with different individuals, decomposition, and sensitivity analysis. Information should be gathered using redundant lines of questioning, and resulting inconsistencies should be investigated until consistency is achieved. Then, there is some comfort that the major discrepancies are eliminated. Use of judgments about the same factor obtained from different qualified individuals has obvious virtues. Decomposit'on involves dividing the assessment into component parts and obtaining judgments on the components. For instance, in addition to asking the product manager about profit from the product, ask component judgments about product manufacturing costs, distribution costs, potential sales at various prices, pricing policy, and competitor actions. Different individuals should provide these inputs which would then be utilized to provide estimates of profit. Sensitivity analysis can identify oroblem elements which are crucial for the evaluation of the alternatives. It is only for these that significant effort is necessary to appraise the recommendations of the analysis,
It
Uses of Decision Analysis
As previously mentioned, the overall use of decision analysis is to provide insight to improve decision making One key manner of deriving this insight is to evaluate the alternatives. This is of course common to most prescriptive analytical approaches. However, decision analysis has other crucial uses to prov.de insight.
A strength of decision analysis is that one can readily calculate the value of additional information (see LaVale [1968] and Merkhofer 119771). This is done by defining and evaluating alternatives which include the costs of gathering specific information and the likelihoods of what that information will be. For example, a test market for a proposed new product may cost one million dollars and the results may indicate potential annual sales anywhere between 20,O() and 5(XlX)() sales per year. If the "test market" alternative has a higher expected utility than the "no test market" alternative, it is worthwhile. By raising the cost of the test market, we can find the cost where these two alternatives art indifferent. This cost is referred to as the value of the test market information and indicates the rmaximum one should pay for that information. Using this basic idea. Gilbert and Richels [1981] analyze the value of uranium resource information for U.S. energy policy decisions. Because of the focus on problem complexities, there are many useful byproducts of decision analysis. The framework of decision analysis promotes honesty by providing the opportunity for various independent checks and centers communication on crucial problem features. For instance, one often develops a clear understanding of the substantive issues of a problem in the process of structuring the objectives hierarchy. This also has the effect of sensitizing different individuals to the issues and perhaps bringing about a commonality of understanding of what the problem is or at least a common set of terms to discus the pro.lem. Also, creative alternatives can be generated by stimulating thinking based on the problem objectives.
Finally, decision analysis can be very important in conflict identification and risolution. It should indicate whether conflicts among various individuals conctrn the possible impacts or the values for these impacts. Furthermore, conflicts may only involve certain objectives in either case. Once conflicts are identified, attention can be concentrated on their resolution by examining the bases for judgments of each individual concerned. It may be that only parts of the individuals' bases differ and these parts are the reason for the conflict. Information might be gathered which would resolve such a conflict. However, there are irresolvable conflicts, such as justifiable differences in values. For these cases. identification of the basis for the conflict may in itself be an important contribution to-ard a more responsible decision.
Man), decision analyses oo not need to be complete. Partial decision analyses which give cursor)y qualitative attention to some steps in Section 3 are definitely appropriate for many decision problems. These partial analyses should focus on the aspects of the overall pioblem where insight might be most fruitful to the decision makers. Once the problem is structured or the impacts of alternatives clarified or the values articulated, the rest of the analysis may be easy or even unnecessary. In these partial analyses. the unique contribution of decision analysis is often the proc:-dures to address explicily the softer parts of the problem-its structure and professional and value judgments.
Pitfalls of Decision Analysis
Decision analysis is subject to the same pitfalls as other approaches designed to assist decision makers. One might categorize these pitfalls as follows:
41.
weak or no logical or theoretical foundations.
2. lack of consideration of subjective and value components of the decision problem, 3. a claim that analysis provides a solution to the decision problem, 4. poor analysis, 5. weak personal interaction skilK.
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As previously stated, the foundation% of decision analysis are strong and the subjective and value aspects of the decision problem are addressed. Hence, specific pitfalls under categories 1 and 2 are rarely the downfall of a decision analysis. Category 3 represents a pi :fall often more common to decision analysis than other approaches. Because decision analysis do,.s try to capture a bigger share of the ' real problem," there is a tendency to assume the entire problem is addressed. Worse though is the misrepresentatior, that such I, an analysis provides a solution to the decision problem. Decision atdalys:. indeed any anailsis, only focuses on part of a problem 'nd this should be under,,tood.
Poor analysis or poor personal init raction can of course, render thc best conceivcd decision analysis as worthless. Rath,,: than repeat all the th ngs that could go wrong here, it may bc more appropriate to refer to Keene\ and Raiffa [19721 for a short critique of decision analysis or to Majone and Q,!,mde [1980] for an entire volume on pitfalls of analysis.
S. APPLICATIONS OF DECISION ANALYSIS
Discussions of early applications of decision analysis in the oil and gas industry are described in Grayson [1960] and Kaufman [1963] , Applications also occurred in other fields, However, lor proprietary rmasons, manry of the completed decision analyses do not appear in the published liter.. ature, Fortunately, the essence of sonic of these analyses do appear in the form of "fictitious" analyses or case studies. Magee [1904a.b] describes applications to capital investment decisions. Howard [19661 discusses a product introduction, and a number of cases representing experiences of the early 1960's are found with analyses in Schlaifer [1968] . Papers by Brown 11970] and Longbottom and Wade [1973] surveyed applications of derision analysis through the 1960's.
The 1970's saw an expansion in applications of decision analysis, The applications concerned both privat, industry and governmentai decisions. They involved new product decisions, research and development efforts, medical problems. energy problems., environmental alternatives, and standard setting, to name a few, In this article, it would not -,, possible to survey all of ,hese appli:ations, Hence we will simply attempt to indicate souices of some applications which are readily available. Many of these sources describe other applicatioi'.;.
There have beer, many applications of decision analysis addressing various corporate problems. Although many of these are proprietary, there are some published examples of these corporate decision ana~yses. Spetzler [1968] describe•s the procedure of assessing a utility function for at corporate board, Matheson [1969] summarizes an application concerning the in'roduction of a new product. The book by Brown. Kahr and Peterson 11974] descrIbes several applications, Keeney 11975] discusses the assessment of a multiple objective corporate utility function to examine corporate policies, Keefer and Kirkwood [1978] discuss an application to optimally allocat. an operating budget for project engineering. A recent application described in Smallwood and Morris [1980] considers whether Xerox Corporation should construct new manufacturing facilities for a new product and when this should be done, Stillwell et al. [1980] report the evaluation of credit applications, Rather than discuss selected applications in medical fields, it is simple, to refer readers to a recent annotated bibliography of decision analysis applicatious b\ Krischer [1980] . The applications address such diverse problems as evaluating governmental programs to save lives, the evaluation of new drup,:, the selection of medical technologies for advanced mr.lical systems, analyses to select treatment strategies for numerous different diseases or ailments. the development of on-line computer systems to assist physicians in decision making. and the development of various health industries. VTher'e have been numerous applications of decision analysis to problems faced by various branches of government over the last decade. Examples of these include the possibility of seeding hurricanes threatening the coasts of the United States (Poward et al. 11972] ). metropolitan airport development in Mexico City (de Neufville and Keeney 1i972]), protection from wildland fires (North et al, [1975] ), trajectory selection for the Mariner Jupiter/Saturn project (Dyer and Miles [1976] ). and the evaluation of busing alternatives to achieve school integration (Edwards [19801) , Several Bv their nature, significant environmental problems concern both government and industry.
In the reent past, there have been a large number of decision analyses addressing, such environmental problems. Examples are the work of Gardiner and Edards 119751 concerning development within the areas under the juris,diction of the California (oastal Commission. kork in~olving Bell 11977a] and Htolling [19781 concerning conroI ofla 'orest pest, the anal,,i,, of marine mining options by Lee 11979], and thv evaluation of rcghnal n',,itonmental systemns b\ Seo and Sakawa [1979] .
The area with perhaps the greawest nu~mber of applications in recent \cars has been ernerg.. Watson 119821). and commercialization of solar photovoltaic systems (Boyd et al. [1982] ). There has beer considerable effort focused on) alternatives faced by the utilit.\ industry. Thes.. inclade the selection of technological alternati\hes for specific projects such as transmis,,ion coridu•Loe. (Crawford et al. [1978] ). the examination of the implications of both over-and under-eapacit, (Cazalct et al. [1978] , the siting of energy facilities (Keeney and Nair [1977] , Keency [198ttb] , and 
HISTORY OF DECISION ANALYSIS'
It is difficult to ti-ice decision analysis from its beginning to the prc:,cnt because of the evolutionary nature of both its content and its name. The foundations of decision analysis are the interwined concepts of subjective probability and utility, and Ramsey [1931] was the first to suggest a theory of decision making based on these two ideas. Two centuries earlicer, Bernoulli [1738] wrote a remarkable paper on the moti\ ation for the concept of utility and on a possible form for a utility function. For a historical discussion of the early development of subjective probability and utility theory, see Fellner [1965] . On the uncertainty side. DeFinetti [19371 contributed greatly to the structure of subjective probability. Modern utility theory for decision making under unccrtaintv was developed, independently, by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1947] . They, postulated j set of axioms simila: to those in the Appendix (using only objective probabilities) aid demonstrated i.,: a utility could be assigned to each coosequence in a manner such that tl'e decision maker should prefer the alternative with the highest expected utility in order to act in accord with the axioms. This result is often referred to as the expected utility hypothesis. Wald [1950] , in his classic work on statistical decision problems, uscd theorems of game theory to prove certain results in statistical decision theory. Although he used an expected-loss criterion instead of utility theory, it was only a minor modification to introduce utility into the Waid framework. This work highlighted a critical problem. namely, how to account for irforrnal inbormation about the states of the world in his model. The school of statisticians and deciion theorists, including J. Marschak. H. Chernoff, and H. Rubin, advocated the use of judgmental probability as one method of tackling the statistical decision problems proposed by Wald. The pioneering \-ork of Blackwell and Girshick [1954] contributed to the integration of utilitiL, i'nd subjective probabilities into a coherent program for handling these problems. Then Savage [1954] . in a major contribution. provided a rigorous philosophical fotndation and axiomatic framework for the approach.
Once the theory was developed, many individuals began applying it to mathematically wellstructured problems involving uncertainties and possibilities for sampling or cxperimentation. These results, building on the previous work of others, formcd a body of results known as Bayesian or statistical decision theory (Schlaifer [1959] , Raiffa ;'nd Schlaifer 11961]. Pratt et al. 11965] ). When in the early 1960's these same individuals and th.ir associates. mainly at the Harvard Business School, began using these theories on real business problems involving uncertainties, whether or 'This section is liberally adapted from Keeney 119781.
.it sampling at. experimentation were possible, an adjective Aas added to yield applied statistical decision theory. Howeve., since applied statistical decision theory was rclesant to broad classes of complex decision problems (see Schlaifer 119691), it was better to have a more application-oriented name, ard the term decision analysi. Appeared in the literatuie (Howard 1196•6t. Over the past thirty years, the contributions of many people concerned with the behavioral aspects of decision making have had a significant impart on prescriptive decision analysis. Fishburn [1904 , 1905 . 19741, Pollak [19671. Raiffa (1969 The techniques and procedures of decision analysis are sufficiently developed to make substintial contributions on many complex decision problems. Compared to other approaches. both tormnai !!nd informal, decision analysis often has much to offer. Compared to "providing all the insight -i decision maker could possibl\ want at a price too low to refuse," there are significant improvements which could be made. Research on the following topics will help lead to these improvements. This research is categorized by the steps of decision analysis outlined in Section 3, Regarding structure of the decision problem, better approaches to develop objective hierarchics, create alternatives, and interrelate the two are needed. The approaches should be systematic to increase the likelihood that important parts of the problem are not being omitted. Procedures are needed to help identify relevant stakeholders-individuals or groups with an interest in the problem-and ensure that their objectives and advocated alternatives are recognized by the anal\-sis. Likewise. more systematic procedures are needed to identify exogenous events not under the decision makers control which could significantly influence the consequences of alternatives. This should reduce the likelihood of unanticipated conusequences. Any analysis excludes many aspects felt to be less relevant than included ones. Yet, in1anv decision problems are interrelated even though at some level it is impractical to include these interrelationships in detail in an analysis. Better means to address the interrelationships are needed in decision analysis. As a specific exampie, a carefully defined attribute to measure flexibility in a decision problem might address the degree to which alternatives in a given problem might foreclose options in other decision problems.
With possible impacts, two major problems deserving additional research concern probabilistic dependencies and multiple experts. Better methods to identify probabilistic dependencies and to elicit subjective probability distributions with probabilistic dependencies would be helpful. On many important problems, different experts disagree about the impacts exnected from various alternatives. Research is needed to prnvide methods to reduce such discrepLncies when appropriate Iin some eases. but that tilc additional assutlipt ions nCccssar\ for thcse othict apptoachics arc irnpot tant to undcrstand and appraise. )ftcn. hitos r. othcr ccrimngf\ comipct ime appr-ioaclics arc not inl conflict \01 it ilte amioms oit decision anals \si. F~or insiancc. in cascs \klhe' c thcre are no unecriat it ties in dcscribing the possible implicatiotns of cacti alitcrnatis and \\ hcrc tic ut utý f unction (i.e.. objcctiise functioti INi lincar. linear programming does not \ioiatc thle axiomis of decision ilnall sis. Ill such ca!.cs. it could lie coniside red at tool of decciioti anal~ sis. s itih the higl ads antage of ctfcct isc ci es aluating anl infinite niumber of alternatis cs and sclece'ing thc best tinc.
Aunique aSPeCt Of iedecision anaisksis formnulat ion is the theory and proccdures, des eloped to frnilk ntro~c nd roces sh~jc61\ .;~dgllclts ll he es all mu of a tcitt ylenles. Profcs ait Iid's afue jud~gmetslll are clcairlý an important parltiof thle ma ijOr prolem~s facinig our societ\ W\ith-problems i-oncerningv abortion. the desira-ihiti, of' capital punishment. ort the treatimciii of terrorist,,. profcssional judgments about the likelihoods of ýarious consequenices resutilng from cach alternative and thle VALuc judgments required to evaluate such alternatises must bei malide. lIn decisions concerning inflation or the cnergý situation of' the countrm judgtmenits musit somehoss be formulated about the likely effects of %arious policies. Value tradeoffs must bie miade beiss en inflation rates and unemployment or between the enierg\ a\ ailablc for personal use ( i.e. . cotmfort and national dependence oin foreign fuels. Ini man\ cases. ito neglect such features misses, the essence of the problem altogether.
Experience in using decision analysis indicates that knoss edgeable professiotnals. industr\ executives. and government officials are ss illing to address, the difficuli professional judgments and value questions necessary to focus mcaningfuflk on the characteristics of complex decision p.h lenis. 1-losever. most analyses of' important decision problems has e left the Incorporation oft judgmients. and valuesý to informal proced~ures with unidentified assumptions atnd ito the in!uition of the decision makers. What has been lacking is not iniormation but at f 'imnesork to articulate and inte- 
APPENDIX. THE AXIOMS OF DECISION ANALYIS
A unique feature of decision analysis is that it i'jas an axiomatic foundation, The axioms provide the rationale and theoretical feasibility for the "divide and conquer" approach of decision analysis, In Section 3, decision analysis was decomposed into four steps:
1. Structure the decision problem.
Assess possible impacts of each alternative:
3. Determine preferences (values) of decision makersý and 4. Evaluate and compare alternatives, Axioms corresponding to Steps I through 3 state conditions under which it is feasible to obtain the necessary information for a decision analysis decomposed in this manner. Axioms corre, nding to
Step 4 provide the substance for aggregating the information in the preceding steps to evaluate the alternatives, To facilitate understanding, the axioems of decision analysis are stated here in an informal and intuitive manner, The complete sense of the axioms is preserved although they are not technicall.h precise, A formal statement of the axioms is found in Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer 119041, In the following. Axioms la and b pertain to Step 1 of the decision analysis methodology, Axiom 2 pertains to Step 2, and so on, Axiom la-Generation of Alternatives. At least two alternativc can be specified.
For each of the alternatives, there will be a number of possible consequences which might result if that alternative is followed.
Axiom Itb--Identification of Consequences, Possible consequences of each alternative can be identified,
In identifying consequences, it may be useful to generate an objectives hierarchy indicating the domain of potential consequences in the problem, Attributes can be specified to provide evaluation scales necessary to indicate the degree to which each objective is achieved, Axiom 2-Ouantification of Judgment, The relative likelihoods (ie.. probabilities) of each possible consequence that could result from each alternative can be specified.
As discussed in Section 3, there are a number of procedures to assist in specifying relative likelihoods. Such probabilistic estimates are based on available data. information collected, analytical or simulation models, and assessmeni f experts' judgments.
Axiom 3-Qu-untification of Preference. ThL relative desirability (i.e.. utilits ) for all the possible consequences of any alternative can he specified.
The preferences which should be quantified in a decision problem are those of the decision makers. It is very helpful if one can assess these preferences directly from the decision maker or decision makers. However. for many problems other individuals have a rcsponmibilitm for recommendinm alternatives to the decision makers. In such problenis. those individual% na, have a responihilit. for articilating an appropriate preference structure.
, Axiom 4a..-Comparison of Alternatives. If tlo alternatives would each result in the same tONO possible consequenes, the alternative yielding tlL higher chance of the preferred Lonsequence is preferred.
Axiom 4.-Transitivity of Preferences. If one alternative is, preferred it) a second alternative and if the second alternative is preferred to a third alternatike, then the first diiernati\e is preferred to the third alternative, Axiom 4c-Substitution of Consequences. It an alternative is modified b. replacing one of its consequences with u set of consequences and associated probabilities (i.e., a lottcr.) that is indifferent to the consequence being replaced, then the original and the modified alternatives should be indifferent.
Axiom 4a is necessary to indicate how various alter: ,ti\es should be. compared, Axioms 4b and 4c are often referred to as consistency axioms, Axiomn 4c alloks one to reduce comple' alternati\cs involving a variety of possible consequences to simple alternatives r'lcrred to in Axiorm 4a, It is then easy to compare alternatives. Axiom 4t, is necessary to include tmnparisons of more than two alternatives.
The main result of these axioms is that the expected utility of an alhcri.-tive is the indication of its desirability. Alternatives with higher expected utilities should be preferred to those with lo~er expected utilities. The probabilities and utilities necessary to calculate expected utility emerge as distinct items, !nformation aboul each must be gathered in conducting a decision analysis. However. the axioms themselves provide little guidance about how to obtain this information, This is discussed in Sections 3 and 4 on the methodology and practice of decision analysis, Decision analysis does not require either a single decision maker or identifiable decision makers. It requires an orientation toward the decision to he made and individuals able and willing to provide information essential to that decision. The essential assumptions in this regard are those givcn in axiore * co-i.:sponding to Steps 1, 2. and 3. What is assumed :s that the information required by those assumptions can be obtained in a useful manner. A decision analysis which structured and analyzed a decision problem without any interaction with or knowledge of the "decision makers" could provide a tremendous amount of insight-the product of decision analysis-to them if they saw the analysis. Recognition of this misconception is important because it has often been stated that an implicit assumption of decision analysis is that the decision maker is a single individual and can be identified. It is further claimed that this assumption is invalid for essentially all important j decision problems. Hence. decision analysis is at best an interesting theoretical exercise, with little practical value, While it may be easier to structure a decision problem and provide critical information by interacting with the identified decision makers, many critical problems do not afford this luxury, It is not essential for constructive decision analysis to occur.
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